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Abstract
Commodities communicate. Consumers choose a consump-
tion bundle both for its intrinsic characteristics and for what
this bundle communicates about their qualities (or identity) to
spectators. We investigate optimal indirect taxation when con-
sumption choices are motivated by two sorts of concerns: intrinsic
consumption and costly signaling. Optimal indirect taxes are in-
troduced into a monotonic signaling game with a nite typespace
of consumers. We provide su¢ cient conditions for the unique-
ness of the D1 sequential equilibrium in terms of strategies. In
the case of pure costly signaling, signaling goods can in equilib-
rium be taxed without burden and the optimal quantity taxes on
these goods are innite. When commodities serve both intrinsic
consumption and signaling, optimal taxes can be characterized
by a generalization of the Ramsey rule, which also deals with the
distortions resulting from signaling.
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1 Introduction
Commodities communicate. In choosing a consumption bundle, con-
sumers care about both the intrinsic qualities of the bundles and what
their choice reveals about themselves to spectators. The intrinsic quali-
ties of a commodity are the (mostly physical) characteristics of the com-
modity itself, which would remain unchanged if the commodity were
consumed in total social isolation. What a commodity communicates
can be understood as its social meaning, and the locus of this social
meaning is the head of the spectators rather than the commodity itself.
The social meaning of a commodity depends on the consumption choices
of all consumers in society, thus introducing an interpersonal interdepen-
dency into the consumer problem. One can generally distinguish two
irreducible dynamics governing social meaning: conformity and distinc-
tion. Conformity is driven by consumers conrming their membership
of the groups or categories they claim to belong to, and can be thought of
as cheap talk signaling. Distinction works by consumers distinguishing
themselves from worse types and functions by a form of costly signaling.
Clearly, these two mechanisms interact in various ways in reality, but
are studied separately for the sake of exposition.
The dependence of the meaning of commodities on the choices of
all other consumers reveals an interesting opportunity for indirect tax-
ation. If taxation changes the choices of all consumers, it also changes
the meaning of a commodity. Building on the words of Richard Layard
(1980) "In a poor society a man proves to his wife that he loves her by
giving her a rose, but in a rich society he must give a dozen roses",
the reasoning of this article can be summarized as: if one taxes roses
su¢ ciently, one rose will satisfy again to get the same job done in rich
societies. If roses were consumed only for communication purposes and
taxation does not break up the signaling equilibrium, then both the man
and his wife remain equally happy after taxation and the tax revenues
are pure gain. If roses are also consumed for intrinsic reasons and the
signaling equilibrium is not broken, then the husband can still commu-
nicate the same message to his wife after taxation, and the policy maker
should only care about intrinsic utility. In reality, consumers often em-
ploy their complete consumption pattern to communicate their identity.
Some kinds of commodities, such as cars or clothing, are more apt for
communication purposes than others. For such a commodities, con-
sumption is motivated relatively more by signaling and less by intrinsic
reasons, such that the intrinsic utility cost of taxing these commodities
is relatively lower. The communicative use of consumption provides thus
a new argument for di¤erentiated indirect taxation.
This article characterizes optimal indirect taxation by means of a
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generalized many-person Ramsey rule in a setting where consumption
patterns are used by consumers to signal their types. More precisely,
consumer choices are modelled as equilibrium strategies in a monotonic
signaling game with consumption patterns as multidimensional signals
about a unidimensional dimension of heterogeneity: income. The model
builds on two branches of the literature: the literature on costly signal-
ing as initiated by Spence (1973) and surveyed in Riley (2001) and the
literature on optimal indirect taxation, as discussed in e.g. Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980) and Myles (1995). The multidimensional signaling
framework hinges on work by a.o. Cho and Sobel (1990). The analy-
sis of taxation of pure costly signaling goods, i.e. commodities which
are uniquely consumed for signaling, is related to and underpins the
analysis of burden free taxes by Ng (1987) for the case of pure diamond
goods (cfr. infra). If goods are used for both signaling and intrin-
sic consumption, the optimal indirect taxation result formally resembles
work on indirect taxation with externalities (e.g. Sandmo, 1975, Cremer,
Gahvari and Ladoux, 1998) or merit goods (Blomquist and Micheletto,
2006), in the sense that the consumer choice di¤ers from the social wel-
fare optimum. Signaling induces consumers to consume too much of
some commodities from a welfare perspective, such that a reduction of
spending on such commodities due to taxes causes a relatively smaller
welfare loss. More generally, this line of reasoning relates to taxes on con-
sumption motivated by relative concerns. Frank (1985, 1999) calls for a
progressive tax on overall consumption, because consumption is deemed
to be largely driven by relative concerns and therefore self-defeating in
terms of social welfare. This article explicitly models the mechanism
driving the relative concerns, allows a characterization of the extent to
which consumption is self-defeating in welfare terms and establishes a
rule for di¤erential indirect taxation of commodity groups which are
used for communication. Ireland (1994) explores commodity taxes in a
unidimensional signaling model and shows in a numerical example how
a small tax on a signaling commodity can be a Pareto improvement.
The second section sets out the formal model and introduces a unique
signaling equilibrium. The third section deals with the benchmark case of
pure costly signaling. It is shown that these goods can be taxed without
burden, such that the revenues from taxing pure costly signaling goods
are a pure gain. In the fourth section, all visible consumption goods serve
both intrinsic consumption and communication. Optimal commodity
taxation is then characterized by a generalization of the conventional
many-person Ramsey rule. The fth section concludes.
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2 Setting
Imagine a nite population of N consumers: Nature draws the type t
of each consumer out of a nite set T with prior probabilities t: The
type of a consumer is her private information and di¤erent consumer
types di¤er ex ante only in one dimension: income mt 2 R++: Assume,
without loss of generality, that mt < mt0 () t < t0: Consumers spend
this income on K di¤erent commodities, indexed k, summarized in a
consumption vector c  (c1; :::; cK) 2 RK+ ; a column vector. This con-
sumption vector consists of one invisible good c1 and a visible consump-
tion bundle c  (c2; :::; cK) ; also a column vector (if K > 2). The visible
consumption pattern will function as a signal regarding the consumers
type to spectators (the other consumers), while the invisible good c1
represents the opportunity cost of visible consumption. Producer prices
are by assumption xed and are normalized to 1. Consumer prices are
denoted by a row vector p  (p1; p) = (p1; :::; pK) 2 RK++; such that the
quantity tax imposed on good k amounts to pk  1; and forms a subsidy
if pk < 1: The budget constraint for a type t is then pc  mt: A mixed
strategy  (t; p) of type t given prices p is a probability distribution over
the visible budget set fcjpc  mtg :
Spectators do not know the true type of a consumer and form beliefs
 (c) about a consumers income, conditional on the visible consumption
vector c; where  is a jT j  dimensional vector, with the t-th entry t (c)
indicating the probability that a consumer with visible consumption pat-
tern c is deemed a type t: Consumer preferences can, by assumption, be
represented by a utility function1
u (c; m^ (c)) ; (1)
where m^ (c) is the average perceived income, as estimated by spectators
given their beliefs
m^ (c) 
TX
t=1
t (c)mt:
Assume that this utility function satises the following regularity con-
ditions.
1In most signaling games, a receiver observes and interprets the signal and chooses
a utility maximizing action as a best reply to the signal c and beliefs  (c) : If these
optimal responses are unique and strictly increasing in m^ (c) and if the senders utility
is strictly increasing in the receivers best reply, then the utility function in formula 1
can be understood as a shorthand notation of this game, omitting the receivers best
reply. Alternatively, one can also interpret this specication as if m^ (:) is a good on
itself, as consumers may also enjoy esteem for its own sake.
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Condition 1 Assume that u is
i) twice continuously di¤erentiable with u01 > 0; u
0
k  0; u0K+1 > 0 and
u0011 < 0; and
ii) such that u01 (:) is bounded and u
0
K+1 (:) is bounded away from zero:
Substitute the budget constraint into the utility function to obtain
(with a slight abuse of notation)
u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^

: (2)
Next to these regularity conditions, the utility function is also assumed
to be such that (2) satises a Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition
for each dimension of c. This means that the slope of the indi¤erence
curve in the (ck; m^) plane is decreasing with the type of a consumer,
or that2
dm^
dck

u=constant
=  @u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^

@ck
 
@u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^

@m^
! 1
must be strictly decreasing with mt for all k = 2; :::; K and all (c; m^) :
Condition 2 Let
pk
p1
u01(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;m^) u0k(p 11 (mt pc);c;m^)
u0K+1(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;m^)
be decreasing in
mt for all k 2 f2; :::; Kg and all (c; m^) :
Note that if u is strongly separable in all arguments, this condition
is already guaranteed by condition 1, because u is strictly concave in
c1 and strictly increasing in m^: For more general specications of u;
condition 2 restricts the cross derivatives to preserve this higher marginal
opportunity cost of signaling for lower income types.
Consumer behavior is characterized by the equilibrium strategies in
a sequential equilibrium of the signaling game.
Denition 1 A tuple ( (t; p) ; ) is a Sequential Equilibrium (S.E.) if
 (t; p) maximizes utility for each type t given beliefs  and beliefs  are
consistent given  in the sense of Bayesian rationality, i.e.:
1. For each type t;
 (t; p) 2 argmax

Z
c2fc0jpc0mtg
u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^ (c)

 (cjt; p) dc

given :
2Given this substitution of the budget constraint in u, we distinguish in notation
between u0k
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^

; the partial derivative to the k-th argument, and
@u(p 11 (mt pc);c;m^)
@ck
; the partial derivative to good ck (with 1 < k  K); as it is found
in the rst and k-th argument of u:
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2. Beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule for all c 2 supp() ;
such that 3
t (c) =
t (cjt; p)P
t0
t0 (cjt0; p) :
How can we describe consumer behavior within this setting? A se-
quential equilibrium is called separatingif the supports of the equilib-
rium consumption patterns of di¤erent types do not intersect:
8t 6= t0 : supp ( (t; p)) \ supp ( (t0; p)) = ?;
such that equilibrium beliefs attribute equilibrium consumption patterns
to a single type with probability 1. The sequential equilibrium concept
imposes no restrictions on beliefs about out-of-equilibrium consumption
patterns (except that they should support the equilibrium) and this
allows for an unappealing multitude of often counterintuitive equilibria.
For this reason, a number of equilibrium renements have been proposed
which impose restrictions on beliefs about out-of-equilibrium consump-
tion patterns. Although the key results of this paper are not limited
to this particular selection criterion or outcome, we focus on the most
commonly used D1 criterion4 and the selected Riley outcome, after Riley
(1979). This Riley outcome, also known as the "Pareto Dominant Sep-
arating Equilibrium" is generally deemed the most plausible solution
for monotonic signaling games (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
3With supp() =
S
t
supp( (t; p)) :
4Divinity (D1) eliminates a consumer type t out of the support of the beliefs

 
c

following an out-of-equilibrium consumption pattern c; if a second type t0
has a strict incentive to deviate to c whenever the rst type t under investigation
has a weak incentive to deviate. Formally, x a S.E. and equilibrium utility levels ut
for each type t: Let
M+(c; t) =
emju 1
p1
 
mt   pc

; c; em > ut
be the set of beliefs (only m^ matters) which make type t strictly better o¤ with c
then in the S.E. Similarly, let
Mo(c; t) =
emju 1
p1
 
mt   pc

; c; em = ut
be the set of beliefs which make type t indi¤erent between consumption pattern c
and the S.E. payo¤s. Then Divinity requires that all types t for whom there is a type
t0 for which
M+(c; t) [Mo(c; t) M+(c; t0);
are eliminated from the support of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
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The Riley outcome is generated by a separating equilibrium in which all
consumers choose consumption to maximize utility under the constraint
that no other type can benet from imitating their consumption pat-
terns and while spectators concentrate all probability mass on their true
type.
Denition 2 The Riley outcome is generated by a S.E. in which all
consumer types t > 1 choose their consumption strategies with support
on visible consumption patterns ct which are a solution to the constrained
maximization problem
ct 2 argmax
c

u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt
	
(3)
subject to c  0 and
u
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt
  ut 1; (4)
with ut 1  u  p 11 (mt 1   pct 1) ; ct 1;mt 1 : Type t = 1 only chooses
c1 2 argmax
c

u
 
p 11 (m1   pc) ; c;m1
	
(5)
subject to c  0:
Hence, the lowest income consumers, with no lower types to distin-
guish themselves from, maximize utility as if there were no signaling
concerns. All higher types t choose a visible consumption pattern which
maximizes utility under the constraint that a worse type t   1 cannot
improve herself by mimicking. As shown in the proof of theorem 1, con-
dition 2 ensures that no other type wishes to imitate type t if type t  1
does not. Since such an S.E. is separating, equilibrium beliefs satisfy
t (c
t) = 1 such that m^ (ct) = mt; which justies setting m^ = mt in
equations (3) to (5).
Cho and Sobel (1990) demonstrate the existence of a D1 S.E. for
the class of monotonic signaling games with a nite typespace and both
a nite or innite multidimensional signal space. They also show the
uniqueness of such a S.E. in terms of outcome and prove that this out-
come coincides with the Riley outcome. The following lemma summa-
rizes their result.
Theorem 1 If u satises conditions 1 and 2, then a D1 sequential equi-
librium exists and the equilibrium outcome is the Riley outcome, as de-
ned by equations 3 to 5.
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Proof. In appendix.
Motivated by this equilibrium selection literature, the remainder fo-
cusses solely on the D1 equilibrium or Riley outcome to characterize
consumer behavior. The result of Cho and Sobel (1990) proves unique-
ness in terms of outcome, but not necessarily in terms of strategies. We
now provide su¢ cient conditions for the Riley problem in equations 3 to
5 to have a unique solution ct for all types t:
Condition 3 Let K and u satisfy either of the following conditions
i) K = 2 and u02 = 0 or u
0
2 > 0 and u is strictly concave in c; or
ii) K = 3; u is strictly increasing (u0k > 0) and strictly concave in c and
let for all c
@2MRS (c2; c3)
@c3@mt
< 0; (6)
with MRS (c2; c3)   p1u
0
3(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;m^) p3u01(p 11 (mt pc);c;m^)
p1u02(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;m^) p2u01(p 11 (mt pc);c;m^)
:
If K > 2; the Riley problem in equations 3 to 5 is nonconvex. The
choice set of a consumer of type t > 1; i.e. the set of visible consumption
bundles in the positive quadrant which satisfy both inequality 4 and the
budget constraint (denoted Lt in gure 1), is typically nonconvex. The
frontier formed by the visible consumption patterns for which inequality
4 is satised with equality (Lot in gure 1) can be both convex and con-
cave. If inequality 4 is not binding, the strict concavity of u guarantees
the uniqueness of a maximum. The inequality in (6) ensures that the
indi¤erence curves which take the budget constraint into account (i.e.
the implied changes in c1 of a change in bundle c) are at all points more
concave (or less convex) for higher income types. This is shown to be a
su¢ cient condition for the utility function of a consumer type t to have
a unique maximum on Lot ; and by extension that the Riley problem in
equations 3 to 5 has a unique solution ct for all types t:
Proposition 1 The Riley problem, as dened by equations 3 to 5 has a
unique solution ct for all types t if u satises conditions 1, 2 and 3.
Proof. In appendix.
Given that consumer behavior is uniquely characterized by equations
3 to 5, we can now engage in nding an optimal system of indirect
taxes. Given a S.E., the indirect utility function of a type t consumer
is written v (t; p) : Let W (v (p)) represent a general Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function which represents the preference ordering of the
8
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of condition ii) in condition 3.
social planner, with v (p) a vector with the (anticipated) indirect utility
functions of all consumers. Given the unique D1 equilibrium strategies
ct, the tax income of a tax schedule characterized by p is
R (p)  N
X
t
t

(p1   1) mt   pc
t
p1
+ (p  1) ct

;
with 1 a K   1 dimensional column vector of ones. The optimal tax
problem, given a S.E,. can then be written as
max
p
W (v (p)) s.t. R (p)  R; (7)
with R an exogenously xed level of required tax revenue.5
The main information issue in this model concerns consumers sig-
naling their quality to other consumers. The government is assumed
to know the preference orderings of consumers and the prior distribu-
tion of the di¤erent consumer types, but does not need to know the
actual type and consumption patterns of consumers. The assumption of
known preference orderings serves to allow the government to maximize
social welfare and can, in principle, be known from a representative sam-
ple. The assumption that individual consumption is not observed by
the government excludes nonlinear indirect tax schemes, which would be
vulnerable to arbitrage. By assumption, the policy maker cannot choose
nonlinear direct tax schemes, which are beyond the scope of this paper
(cfr. infra).
5The possibility of nonconcavities inW (v (p)) or nonconvexities in its domain and
the justication of the rst order approach is a known problem, but not discussed
further here (see e.g.. Mirrlees (1986)).
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3 Pure costly signaling
Consider the baseline case of pure costly signaling, in which visible con-
sumption c serves only one purpose: distinguishing oneself from worse
types. This pure costly signaling case is formalized by condition 4.
Condition 4 Let u be such that for 2  k  K : u0k = 0; u001k = 0 and
u00kK+1 = 0:
Since the vector c does not a¤ect utility directly, the utility function
can be rewritten as a function of two arguments:
uCS
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; m^ (c)

:
Consumers derive utility from consuming the invisible good c1 and from
making an impression m^ (:) on others, such that the visible goods c a¤ect
utility only through m^ (c). Under condition 4, allK 1 visible goods are
equivalent ways of conspicuously wasting purchasing power. Without
loss of generality, we simplify the analysis for this case by setting K = 2
to avoid a multiplicity of signaling equilibria. The results obtained for
K = 2 in this section easily extend to K > 2:
The Riley outcome for the pure costly signaling case solves (omitting
c  0):
max
c
uCS
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ;mt

uCS
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ;mt
  uCS  p 11 (mt 1   pct 1) ;mt 1 : (8)
Note that visible consumption only appears multiplied by its own
price in this problem. To ensure separation, consumer type t needs to
spend exactly enough on pure costly signaling, pct; to make a lower type
indi¤erent between wasting pct from her income mt 1; in order to be
perceived as a t type, and wasting pct 1 to appear of a type t 1: Hence,
denoting by e(t; p)  pct the total expenditure on visible consumption
goods of a consumer type t, the Riley outcome is characterized by the
unique amount of expenditures e(t; p) which solves for each type t > 1
max
e
uCS
 
p 11 (mt   e) ;mt

(9)
uCS
 
p 11 (mt 1   e) ;mt
  uCS  p 11 [mt 1   e (t  1; p)] ;mt 1 : (10)
Type 1 does not waste any income on visible consumption e(1; p) =
0: Note that these equilibrium expenditures on pure costly signals are
independent of the price of visible goods p, such that one can abuse
notation to write e(t; p1): Consumers only need to waste enough in terms
of opportunity costs to keep worse types from mimicking, and there is
no reason why the optimal amount of wasted c1 should depend on p:
These equilibrium features are summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 If u satises conditions 1, 2 and 4, then:
1. All D1 sequential equilibria are characterized by pct = e(t; p1); with
e(t; p1) solving problem 9 and 10 for each type t.
2. Equilibrium expenditures on visible consumption are independent
of p.
The equilibrium demand for visible consumption as a function of the
own post tax price can then be written
ct =
e(t; p1)
p
;
such that the own price elasticity of the demand for visible goods is then
necessarily  1 everywhere:
@ct
@p
p
ct
=  e(t; p1)
p2
p
ct
=  1:
Thus, in the pure costly signaling case the equilibrium demand functions
for pure costly signals of all type t > 1 consumers are necessarily rectan-
gular hyperbola as a function of the own price. Since t = 1 consumers
do not buy any costly signal, the aggregate demand function of c is a
rectangular hyperbola as well. The insensitivity of equilibrium expen-
ditures on pure costly signaling for changes in the own price implies an
interesting feature: visible goods can, in equilibrium, be taxed without
burden.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the utility of consumers is una¤ected by taxes
on the pure costly signal:
@vCS (t; p)
@p
= 0;
with vCS(t; p)  uCS  p 11 [mt   e (t; p1)] ;mt and uCS (:) satisfying con-
ditions 1, 2 and 4.
The reason is that both arguments of the utility function are unaf-
fected by taxes on c, as long as the signaling equilibrium is maintained.
First, expenditures on visible goods are independent of p, such that the
consumption of invisible goods is una¤ected by a tax on visible goods.
Second, as long as the fully separating equilibrium is maintained, the
second argument is not a¤ected by changes in p either. It is easily seen
that increasing p does not break up conditions 1, 2 and 4, needed to
maintain the separating equilibrium. An optimal system of taxes max-
imally exploits this potential for burden free taxation and the income
wasted on costly signaling is recuperated as much as possible.
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Proposition 2 In the D1 equilibrium of the pure costly signaling game,
in which the utility function satises conditions 1, 2 and 4, optimal in-
direct taxes satisfy
p1 =
P
t2T
t (mt   e(t; p1))P
t2T
t (mt   ct)  RN
(11)
p2!+1:
Proof. In appendix.
The rst equality in 11 can be rewritten
p1   1
p1
=
R  p2 1
p2
N
P
t2T
te(t; p1)
N
P
t2T
t (mt   e(t; p1)) ; (12)
in which p2 1
p2
N
P
t2T
te(t; p1) are the tax revenues from taxing the vis-
ible consumption good, such that the tax rate on invisible goods should
equal the ratio of the di¤erence between required tax revenue and tax
revenue raised on visible goods to total expenditure on invisible goods.
Hence, one should subsidize invisible consumption p1 < 1 if the burden-
free tax revenues from taxing visible consumption exceed the required
revenues. If the required revenues exceed the burden-free revenue from
taxing visible consumption, then these revenues should be raised by a
tax on invisible consumption.
The result is that each consumer type, by buying the innitely taxed
visible consumption good, conspicuously contributes just enough to the
required tax revenue to distinguish herself from any lower income types.
The policy maker collects almost all the means wasted for social distinc-
tion. This result underpins the burden free tax result of Ng (1987) for
the case of pure diamond goods. Ng denes pure diamond goodsas
goods which are uniquely valued for their value and therefore enter the
utility function together with their price. For x a diamond goodand
y a regular good, px and py their respective prices and m income, the
consumer problem is then
maxU(pxx; y)
s.t. pxx+ pyy  m:
This section shows that pure costly signaling goods are necessarily pure
diamond goods. Clearly, the innite tax on pure costly signals crucially
hinges, as a limit case, on the perfect divisibility and observability of the
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visible good. Very high taxes on the visible good only leave the individual
una¤ected if the very small consumed quantities of the visible good of
di¤erent types can be distinguished, such that the di¤erent consumer
types can be identied by spectators. The basic intuition of this section,
however, remains valid under much broader assumptions.
4 The mixed signaling case
In reality, not too many - if any - consumption goods only serve costly
signaling. Mostly, consumers use every day consumption goods, often
with luxurious characteristics, to distinguish themselves from worse con-
sumer types. These conspicuous premium characteristics are excessively
costly for the extra utility they generate, compared to some other less
conspicuous good which would generate more marginal utility in social
isolation. Formally, preferences are assumed such that u satises condi-
tions 1, 2 and 3,ii). Hence, u is such that all visible goods now generate
intrinsic utility and the marginal utility they deliver is decreasing in the
number of already consumed units.
The problem of the lowest income type 1 is:
max
c
L = u (c;m1)  1 (pc m1) ;
in which 1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget con-
straint of type 1. The optimum c1 is characterized by the usual equality
of the marginal rate of substitution to relative prices, taking m^ = m1 as
given:
8k; l = 1; :::; K : u
0
k (c
1;m1)
u0l (c1;m1)
=
pk
pl
: (13)
The optimal choice is the consumption bundle chosen in the absence of
signaling concerns, i.e. the intrinsic optimum. The unique D1 equilib-
rium consumption pattern ct of each type t > 1 characterizes the Riley
outcome and is the unique solution, given ct 1; to:
max
c
L = u (c;mt)  t (pc mt)
  t
 
u
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt
  ut 1 ;
where t and  t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with respectively
the budget and Riley constraint of a type t consumer.6 The rst order
6The optimal solution of the constrained maximization problem in equations 3 to
5 is characterized by Lagrange optimization, as is common practice in the optimal
taxation literature despite known problems (see e.g. Mirrlees, 1986). The proof of
proposition 1 contains a partially constructive proof of the optimum, from which the
optimality of the solution to the Lagrange maximization problem can be veried.
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conditions for a type t > 1 consumer are
u01
 
ct;mt
  tp1 = 0 (14)
8k > 1 : u0k
 
ct;mt
  tpk    t  pkp1u01  p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt+u0k  p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

= 0:
Optimal consumer choices are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If u satises conditions 1, 2 and 3,ii), the unique D1 equi-
librium consumption pattern is characterized by
8k; l = 1; :::; K : u
0
k (c
1;m1)
u0l (c1;m1)
=
pk
pl
(15)
8t > 1 : u
0
2 (c
t;mt) +Bt;2
u03 (ct;mt) +Bt;3
=
p2
p3
and 8k; t > 1 : u
0
k (c
t;mt) +Bt;k
u01 (ct;mt)
=
pk
p1
(16)
with Bt;k   t
 pk
p1
u01
 
p 11 (mt 1   pct) ; ct;mt
 
u0k
 
p 11 (mt 1   pct) ; ct;mt
  (17)
t  0;  t  0; c  0:
How to interpret this equilibrium consumption pattern? Clearly, if
incomes are so distant that the Riley constraint is not binding, such that
 t = 0; type t chooses her intrinsic optimum. If  t 6= 0; then it must
be that u0k (c
t;mt) <
pk
p1
u01 (c
t;mt) and
pk
p1
u01
 
p 11
 
mt 1   pct

; ct;mt

> u0k
 
p 11
 
mt 1   pct

; ct;mt

; (18)
such that  t > 0 and Bt;k > 0:
7 The term between square brackets
is the marginal utility cost of an increased consumption of good k to
7To see this, verify in the proof of theorem 1 that if type t consumers choose
ct in the S.E., then spectators attribute any consumption pattern c > ct to a type
t0 < t consumer with zero probability. Suppose then that  t 6= 0 and u0k (ct;mt) >
pk
p1
u01 (c
t;mt) : Then type t consumers can strictly improve themselves by increasing
their consumption of good k at the expense of the invisible good (while keeping the
rest of the visible consumption pattern constant). Note that this is always possible,
because if ct exhausts the whole income of the type t consumer, it must be that
 t = 0: But then c
t cannot be utility maximizing, a contradiction. If u0k (c
t;mt) <
pk
p1
u01 (c
t;mt) ; then (18) is true by condition 1.
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a type t   1 mimicker of the t type. More precisely, it is the utility
gain of a marginal shift in consumption from good k to good 1 for a
consumer of type t   1; if she were imitating a type t consumer. The
Lagrange multiplier  t measures the marginal utility which a marginal
unit of equilibrium utility for a type t 1 consumer generates maximally
for the t type consumer. Hence,  t quanties the marginal utility of
relaxing the Riley constraint to consumer t by marginally increasing
ut 1: Rewrite (16) to see that Bt;k measures the gain in intrinsic utility
which a marginal shift of consumption from visible good ck to invisible
good c1 would generate for a type t consumer:
pk
p1
u01
 
ct;mt
  u0k  ct;mt = Bt;k:
If utility were strongly separable in invisible consumption, such that
8k 2 f2; 3g : u001;k(:) = 0; then
u0k
 
ct;mt

= u0k
 
p 11
 
mt 1   pct

; ct;mt

and the rst order conditions of all K   1 visible goods can be written
8t > 1 : u
0
2 (c
t;mt)
u03 (ct;mt)
=
p2
p3
(19)
8t; k > 1 : (1   t)u
0
k (c
t;mt)
u01 (ct;mt)   tu01
 
p 11 (mt 1   pct) ; c;mt
 = pk
p1
; (20)
such that
u0k (c
t;mt)
u01 (ct;mt)
<
pk
p1
:
This means that if the utility function were separable in invisible con-
sumption, all types t > 1 would mimic the intrinsically optimal visible
consumption pattern of a (generically ctitious) higher income type.
Equation 19 states that the marginal rate of substitution of all visi-
ble commodities should equal their relative prices, as in the intrinsic
optimum. Equation 20 however, states that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of a visible and the invisible good is smaller than their relative
prices if the Riley constraint is binding: The type t > 1 consumers in-
ate their visible consumption pattern to a visible consumption pattern
which consumers with a higher income would choose in the absence of
signaling motives, to discourage imitation by lower types.
If visible consumption is not separable from invisible consumption,
then the term
u0k
 
p 11
 
mt 1   pct

; ct;mt

15
in equation 17 causes a deviation in visible consumption away from the
visible intrinsic optimum of higher income types, towards visible goods
with a higher complementarity with the invisible good c1 and hence
relatively smaller
u0k
 
p 11
 
mt 1   pct

; ct;mt

:
A visible good with a higher complementarity with invisible consump-
tion implies less marginal utility if consumed with less invisible goods.
As such, imitating higher typesconsumption of this visible good is more
costly for lower types and this feature is exploited in the optimal visible
consumption pattern of all but the lowest income type.
The bias away from the intrinsic optimum caused by signaling sug-
gests interesting opportunities for optimal indirect taxation. As long as
conditions 1, 2 and 3,ii) are satised, all types are in equilibrium recog-
nized as their true self, m^ (ct) = mt: However, signaling generates an
inequality in the marginal intrinsic utility which a marginal cent spent
on each of the K commodities produces. Thus, marginally reducing the
expenditures on invisible consumption generally induces more utility loss
than an equivalent reduction of expenditures on a visible good, and more
so for visible goods which are complementary to c1.
The policy makers problem is to choose a tax policy p which satis-
es the tax revenue constraint and which is such that the D1 signaling
equilibrium maximizes social welfare. The problem of the policy maker
is
max
p
L = W (v (p))  
 
R N
X
t2T
t
KX
k=1
(pk   1) ctk
!
;
with  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government tax rev-
enue constraint.
The rst order condition for any tax pj is
N
X
t2T
t
@W
@u(ct;mt)
KX
k=1
@u(ct;mt)
@ctk
@ctk
@pj
(21)
+N
X
t2T
t
 
KX
k=1
(pk   1) @c
t
k
@pj
+ ctj
!
= 0 8j = 1; :::; K:
Using equations 14 and 17, these rst order conditions in (21) can be
written:
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X
t2T
t
@W
@u(ct;mt)
 
KX
k=1
tpk
@ctk
@pj
 
KX
k=2
Bt;k
@ctk
@pj
!
(22)
+
X
t2T
t
 
KX
k=1
(pk   1) @c
t
k
@pj
+ ctj
!
= 0 8j = 1; :::; K:
Dene the marginal social benet of an extra unit of income for a
type t consumer as !t  @W@u(ct;mt)t; let ecj  P
t2T
tc
t
j represent average
equilibrium consumption of good j and take the derivative of the budget
constraint for some type t with respect to pj; such that
KX
k=1
pk
@ctk
@pj
=  ctj:
Using this, the rst order conditions can be written
 
X
t2T
t!tc
t
j  
X
t2T
t!t
KX
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
(23)
+
 X
t2T
t
KX
k=1
(pk   1) @c
t
k
@pj
+ ecj! = 0 8j = 1; :::; K;
with ~Bk;t  Bk;t : The expression in equation 23 can already be under-
stood as an uncompensated version of the many-person Ramsey rule,
with an extra term due to signaling motives. Note the resemblance
of this optimal indirect tax prescription to that of Sandmo (1975) for
optimal indirect taxes with externalities. Following Diamond and Mir-
rlees (1971) and Diamond (1975), one may obtain a variant of the usual
compensated many-person Ramsey rule by employing the Slutsky de-
composition on the @c
t
k
@pj
between brackets, i.e. use
@ctk
@pj
= tk;j   ctj
@ctk
@mt
:
Here tk;j denotes element k; j of the Slutsky matrix of a type t con-
sumer in equilibrium, reecting the rst order e¤ect of a change in the
compensated demand of commodity k because of a marginal increase in
the price of commodity j (and keeping m^ = mt): One only considers
the distortion along the compensated demand curve because the income
e¤ects ctj
@ctk
@mt
are generated by any form of taxation (also lump sum),
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such that this distortion is inevitable for any tax scheme. Substituting
the Slutsky equation into equation 23, one obtains

KX
k=1
(pk   1)
X
t2T
t
t
k;j =  ecj + X
t2T
t
KX
k=1
(pk   1) ctj
@ctk
@mt
+
X
t2T
t!tc
t
j +
X
t2T
t!t
KX
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
8j = 1; :::; K
or
KP
k=1
(pk   1)
P
t2T
t
t
k;jecj =  
"
1 
X
t2T
t
!t

ctjecj  X
t2T
t
KX
k=1
(pk   1)
ctjecj @c
t
k
@mt
#
+
X
t2T
tecj!t
KX
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
8j = 1; :::; K
Finally, dening
bt =
!t

+
KX
k=1
(pk   1) @c
t
k
@mt
as the net social marginal valuation of income for a type t consumer
(i.e. net in the sense that it also counts the extra taxes the government
receives when giving a type t consumer an extra unit of income), the
main result of this section is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If u satises conditions 1, 2 and 3,ii) and all consumers
choose their unique D1 equilibrium consumption pattern, then an optimal
system of indirect taxes should satisfy
8j = 1; :::; K :
KP
k=1
(pk   1)
P
t2T
t
t
k;jecj =  
"
1 
X
t2T
t

bt
ctjecj
#
+ 
j;
(24)
with

j  1ecjX
t2T
t!t
KX
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
: (25)
How should one understand the optimal indirect tax rule in equations
24 and 25? If 8t :  t = 0; such that all types would choose their intrinsic
optimum and therefore 8j : 
j = 0; the tax rule in equation 24 reduces
to the usual Ramsey rule in a many-person setting. The left hand side
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represents the proportional reduction in consumption of the j-th com-
modity along the compensated demand function due to taxes. In a
single person setting without signaling, e¢ ciency requires that this pro-
portional reduction is the same for all commodities, as shown by Frank
Ramseys (1929) seminal paper. In a many-person setting, distribu-
tional concerns cause the policy maker to deviate from this equality of
proportional reductions, as induced by the term between square brackets
in equation 24. The term
P
t2T
t

bt
ctjecj

can be understood as the covari-
ance between the net marginal social valuation of income and the relative
consumption of a commodity j: If this covariance is positive, indicating
that the commodity is consumed relatively more by consumers with a
high bt; then the many-person Ramsey rule prescribes that taxes should
induce a relatively smaller proportional reduction in the consumption
of commodity j. If the covariance is negative, such that the good is
relatively more consumed by consumers with a lower net social marginal
valuation of income, then optimal commodity taxes should generate a
relatively larger proportional reduction of (compensated) demand for the
good.
Signaling provides a second reason to deviate from Ramseys equality
of proportional reductions in compensated demand and this deviation is
captured by the term 
j. First, consider the last part in equation 25,
KP
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
. Remember that theBk;ts represent marginal intrinsic utility
gain which a shift in consumption from good ck to c1 would imply for the
type t consumers in equilibrium. The ~Bk;t express this utility loss due to
signaling in monetary terms. If an increase in pj shifts the consumption
pattern of a type t consumer more towards goods with a high Bk;t; then
taxing good j implies a greater increase in
KP
k=2
~Bk;t
@ctk
@pj
, the ine¢ ciencies
in monetary terms due to signaling in type ts consumption pattern. If
taxing good j shifts consumption away from goods with a high ~Bk;t; this
term can be negative for some types, indicating an e¢ ciency gain from
taxing good j for type t consumers. This monetary value of the change
signaling ine¢ ciencies due to a change in pj is then multiplied with !t,
the marginal social benet of an additional unit of income for a type t
consumer, to measure the change in social welfare due to a change in the
signaling ine¢ ciencies in the consumption pattern of a consumer of type
t: This measure is then aggregated for all consumers (i.e. summed over
all types weighted by their proportion in the population t). The factor
1

translates this aggregate measure of the social value of changes in sig-
naling e¢ ciencies into monetary terms. Finally, the factor 1ecj relates this
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e¤ect inversely to the average consumption of good j. Remember thatecj constitutes the additional per capita tax revenue of a marginal in-
crease in pj: As such, 
j measures the change due to a marginal increase
of the tax on good j in the average social value (in monetary terms) of
signaling e¢ ciencies per unit of tax revenue gained from taxing good j.
If a marginal increase of pj reduces the average social ine¢ ciency from
signaling, then the optimal tax scheme should allow for a greater propor-
tional reduction of commodity j along the compensated demand curve
(remember that the LHS in negative!). Similarly, if raising pj would ag-
gravate the average social ine¢ ciencies due to signaling, such that 
j is
high, then this calls for a smaller proportional reduction of commodity j
along the compensated demand curve than the traditional many-person
Ramsey rule without signaling would prescribe.
5 Conclusions
When consumers use their visible consumption bundle for intrinsic rea-
sons as well as for costly signaling, their consumption choices are biased
away from what they would choose in the absence of signaling motives.
They buy relatively too many visible commodities and spend too little
on invisible commodities, such that the intrinsic utility of a marginal
cent invested in invisible consumption is strictly higher than that of a
marginal cent invested in visible consumption. The welfare loss in-
duced by signaling has been recognized since ages and has motivated
Roman and medieval policy makers to forbid certain forms of conspicu-
ous consumption by sumptuary laws. It is easily understood within the
model above that imposing restrictions on the consumption of one or a
few visible consumption goods cannot solve the problem and will merely
lead to a shift of costly overconsumption towards other visible com-
modities. If the elimination of costly signaling is the goal of the policy
maker, then altering the incentives to engage in signaling by targeting
the information structure (e.g. revealing more information about the
true qualities of people) or the rewards to relative superiority seems the
surest way to proceed. Rather, this article has explored and advocated
how costly signaling can also be an opportunity for policy makers. The
endogeneity of the social meaning of visible consumption with respect
to taxes implies that the equilibrium meaning of the pre-tax and post-
tax equilibrium consumption bundles is identical. As a consequence,
no utility which stems from the communicative function of visible con-
sumption is a¤ected by taxes, and the policy maker needs to focus only
on the intrinsic utility of consumption. In this sense, the welfarist ap-
proach exposed above and a non-welfarist approach which takes only
intrinsic utility from consumption as an argument in the social welfare
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function, result in identical optimal tax rules. In both cases, optimal
indirect taxes exploit the di¤erences in marginal intrinsic utility which
marginal investments in di¤erent commodities generate. In the extreme
case of pure costly signaling, this even results in burden-free tax revenue.
Signaling thus provides an additional motive for di¤erentiated indirect
taxation. To the extent that the consumption of luxury goods is moti-
vated more by communicative purposes, the above analysis presents an
e¢ ciency argument, next to equity, for taxing luxury goods relatively
more. However, the same analysis also suggests that communication
through consumption is unlikely to be restricted to the wealthiest con-
sumers, and that e¢ ciency gains can also made for lower income types.
Which commodity groups are consumed most for signaling, and to what
extent, is essentially an empirical question, and beyond the scope of this
text.
Doesnt taxing one signaling commodity imply that it will be merely
substituted by another and wont tax authorities be caught in a race they
can never win? Within the model exposed in this text, such a signaling
substitution is not an issue. Substitution e¤ects are in this model en-
tirely driven by the structure of intrinsic utility, which determines both
the intrinsic utility of the commodity and the costs to imitators. These
substitution e¤ects are taken into account in the generalized Ramsey
rule in equation 24. There is no other reason within the framework
exposed here why taxes should shift choices towards untaxed commodi-
ties. Twenty euros spent on roses mean ceteris paribus the same before
and after a tax on roses and in terms of communication it is of no im-
portance whether one buys twenty or two roses for that amount. In
general, requiring that one or more visible commodities are exempted
from taxation should not pose too much of a problem within the current
framework either. This merely implies a restriction on the policy mak-
ers problem, while consumer behavior is still described just as much by
equations 15 to 17. There is no reason from a communicative point of
view why consumers would prefer to shift to the untaxed visible goods.
If the tax authority cannot tax all specimens of a visible commod-
ity and if spectators cannot distinguish taxed from untaxed specimens,
then taxes may impair the informational value of a commodity. This
can occur in the case of visible durables and other visible commodities
of which consumers keep a stock, for commodities produced at home by
some consumers or because of fraud. If spectators cannot distinguish
between taxed and untaxed specimens, then the meaning of these com-
modities should be some convex combination (by Bayesian updating) of
the pre-tax and perfectly taxed post tax meaning. In such a case, con-
sumers will want to substitute this commodity with other, more taxable,
21
commodities.
Finally, three remarks about the limitations of the analysis exposed
in this article seem in place. First, the signaling game in this text has
considered consumption patterns as multidimensional signals about a
single dimension of heterogeneity. Clearly, real world consumption com-
municates about many di¤erent qualities of its consumers. Although we
believe that the key intuitions of this text remain valid, the introduc-
tion of multiple dimensions of heterogeneity into the signaling model will
certainly complicate a.o. the analysis of the substitution e¤ects due to
taxation. Second, the partial equilibrium analysis of the optimal taxa-
tion problem has neglected the e¤ects of taxation on the production side
of the market. In a general equilibrium setting, one expects the tax rule
suggested above to generate e¢ ciency gains by shifting production to-
wards commodities which generate more intrinsic utility, and away from
commodities which are mostly consumed for communication purposes.
Finally, our analysis has not considered the possibility of nonlinear direct
taxation in the above setting. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that if
the policy maker can choose nonlinear direct tax schemes and if the con-
sumersutility function is separable between labor and all commodities,
no indirect taxed need be employed. The present analysis suggests an
additional argument in favor of the use of indirect taxes, next to argu-
ments based on e.g. Pigovian taxes, merit goods or the prevention of tax
fraud. If tax revenue can be raised without burden, then an optimal tax
scheme should rst exploit this potential before relying on direct taxes.
This line of reasoning is reserved for future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
A large part of this proof is in essence an adaptation of the proofs
of lemma 4.1 and propositions 4.1-4.5 in Cho and Sobel (1990) to the
present setting.
1. The problem in equations 3 to 5 is well dened for this
framework.
The set of c satisfying inequality 4 is compact and nonempty since
mt > mt 1 for all t > 1 (hence, any type t > 1 can always sep-
arate from lower types), and u is continuous. If for any visible
consumption pattern c; pc > mt; then obviously  (tjc) = 0:
2. If type t0 chooses c0 in the S.E., then no type t00 < t0 chooses
a bundle c00 > c0 with positive probability. Let t00 < t0 and
assume that c00 > c0 are both feasible for both types and denote
z (c; t; m^)  u  p 11 (mt   pc) ; c; m^ :
Consider a S.E. in which type t0 chooses c0 to get m^0 with a positive
probability. Let m^00 be the value for m^ making types t0 indi¤erent
between c0 and c00: The single crossing condition implies that if type
t0 is indi¤erent between bundles (c0; m^0) and (c00; m^00) ; then type t00
strictly prefers (c0; m^0) to (c00; m^00) : Since the indi¤erence curves of
the t00 type are steeper for each dimension of visible consumption
k in the (ck; m^) plane, t00 needs to be compensated with more m^
for the increase from c0 to c00 than t0: Suppose that
M+(c00; t0) [M o(c00; t0) M+(c00; t00) [M o(c00; t00);
then this implies that type t00 would strictly prefer bundle (c0; m^0) to
her equilibrium bundle, a contradiction. Hence, if the S.E. survives
the D1 criterion, it must be that  (t00jc00) = 0 and no t00 chooses a
signal c00:
3. What if c00 and c0 cannot be vector ordered? Then construct a c
such that type t0 is indi¤erent between the bundles (c0; m^0) and
(c0; m^0) ; and (choose c00 and c0 such that) c00 > c: Then proceed
as above to nd that for any c00 above the iso-utility surface of a
type t0 consumer, for any t00 < t0 it is true that  (t00jc00) = 0.
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4. There can be no pooling above 0: Assume otherwise that dif-
ferent types pool at c0; to get m^ (c0) and that t0 > t00 are the highest
types in the pool. Then mt > m^ (c0) and for any c00 > c0 by point
2;  (t00jc0) = 0: Choose c00 such that type t00 would be indi¤erent
between the bundles (c0; m^ (c0)) and (c00;mt) : Then by condition
2, type t0 would strictly prefer (c00;mt) to (c0; m^ (c0)), but then t0
cannot choose c0 in equilibrium.
5. There is no pooling at 0: Let m (t)  1PT
t0=t t0
PT
t0=t t0mt0 be
average income of the types weakly smaller than t. Type t sepa-
rates from the lower types i¤ for at least one k 2 f2; :::; Kg ; it is
true that
 pk
p1
u01

mt
p1
; 0; m (t)

+ u0k

mt
p1
; 0; m (t)

dck+
u

mt
p1
; 0;mt

  u

mt
p1
; 0; m (t)

> 0:
Hence, marginal utility of the invisible consumption should not be
so high that it inhibits even the smallest investment in a visible
commodity to distinguish oneself from lower types and gain by a
discrete jump in m^. Condition 1, ii) requires that u01 (:) is bounded
and u0K+1 (:) is bounded away, such that a dck > 0 can always be
found for which the above inequality applies.
6. All D1 S.E. generate the Riley outcome. If ut are the utility
levels obtained in the Riley outcome, then in any S.E. that is D1,
type t gets utility ut: Imagine a S.E. in which type t gets a di¤erent
payo¤ uo: As type t separates in all S.E. under the above condi-
tions, and is thus recognized as a type t; it must be that uo  ut;
since the latter is a maximum. At the other hand, it must be that
uo  ut: Imagine otherwise, i.e. that uo < ut: Then a visible con-
sumption pattern c exists such that types t0 < t can not benet
from imitation and u

mt pc
p1
; c;mt

> uo: Type t0 does not wish
to imitate since then m^ (c) < mt; such that  (cjt0) = 0; but this
contradicts individual rationality.
7. Existence. An equilibrium exists in which consumers play strate-
gies with support on solutions to the Riley problem ct; equilibrium
strategies are interpreted t (c
t) = 1 (or m^ (ct) = mt): For each
out-of-equilibrium consumption pattern c; dene for each typeemt  c by
z
 
c; t; emt  c = ut
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and et  c  min
T

tjemt  c = min
t02T
emt0  c :
Then set the beliefs at
t
 
c

= 1, t = et  c
= 0 otherwise.
Hence, D1 dictates to concentrate all mass of the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs on the consumer most willing to consume out-of-equilibrium
pattern c; i.e. who has the lowest em  c : Note that if c > ct 1
and c < ct; then single crossing implies that t 1
 
c

= 1:
These beliefs are D1 by construction. Strategies are optimal by
construction. No equilibrium consumption pattern of another type
is an improvement: no visible consumption pattern of a higher type
can be an improvement by construction. No visible consumption
pattern of a lower type can be an improvement: if the Riley con-
straint is binding, then z (ct 1; t  1;mt 1) = z (ct; t  1;mt) and
the single crossing condition means that
z
 
ct 1; t;mt 1

< z
 
ct; t;mt

:
If the constraint is not binding, then
z
 
ct; t;mt
  z  ct 1; t;mt > z  ct 1; t;mt 1 ;
where the rst inequality obtains because type t is maximizing
utility without constraints, and second by monotonicity of utility in
m^: No other out-of-equilibrium pattern can be strictly better than
an equilibrium consumption pattern: consumers get the same m^
for a bundle that is equivalent or strictly higher (and more costly)
than (a bundle equivalent to) the equilibrium bundle.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
1. Uniqueness for condition i). If condition i) applies, then c >
ct 1 and u

1
p1
(mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

 ut 1 denes a convex set on
which the continuous and strictly concave function u is maximized.
2. Uniqueness for condition ii). If K = 3; then dene
Lot 

cju  p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt = ut 1 and c  0	
and
Lt  fcj9c0 2 Lot : c  c0 and pc  mt and c  0g :
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Wemust show that u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

has a unique maximum
on Lt: Note that this maximum then lies either in LtnLot or on Lot :
If it lies in LtnLot ; it is the global maximum for consumer t; and is
unique because of the strict concavity of u: In this case, the Riley
constraint is not binding for type t; and type t chooses her intrinsic
optimum characterized by
u0k(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;mt)
u0
k0(p
 1
1 (mt pc);c;mt)
= pk
pk0
:
If the Riley constraint in inequality 4 is binding for a type t con-
sumer, then her maximum lies on Lot ; and we show that u
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

has a unique maximum on Lot under the conditions 1, 2 and 3,ii).
3. Uniqueness on Lot : The indi¤erence curve L
o
t is characterized by
MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) =
@c2
@c3
t 1
Lot
=  p1u
0
3
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt
  p3u01  p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt
p1u02
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt
  p2u01  p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt :
Dene in the same fashion
MRSt (c; Lot ) =  
p1u
0
3
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt
  p3u01  p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt
p1u02
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt
  p2u01  p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt :
Note that at any maximum on Lot ; MRS
t (c; Lot ) < 0 and
p1u
0
3
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

< p3u
0
1
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

;
i.e. both numerator and denominator ofMRSt (c; Lot ) are negative.
Assume otherwise, such that e.g.
p1u
0
3
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

> p3u
0
1
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

;
then consumer type t can improve herself by shifting consumption
from c1 to c3; thus moving strictly above Lot ; and this point cannot
be a maximum.
If at a
c 2 Lot :MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) < MRSt (c; Lot ) < 0;
then type t can improve herself by moving on Lot towards more
c3; since this allows a greater reduction in c2 than necessary to
compensate the increase in c3 and
p1u
0
2
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

< p2u
0
1
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

:
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If, on the other hand, at a
c 2 Lot :MRSt (c; Lot ) < MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) < 0;
then type t can improve herself by moving on Lot towards less c3;
as this reduction in c3 is then compensated by a smaller increase
in c2 than needed to maintain the same utility level. A su¢ cient
condition for the uniqueness of a maximum on Lot requires that
a unique c3 exists such that for c 2 Lot and c3 < c3 means that
MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) < MRS
t (c; Lot ) < 0 and for c 2 Lot and c3 >
c3 rather MRS
t (c; Lot ) < MRS
t 1 (c; Lot ) < 0: Since u is C
2 by
condition 1, i), at this maximum it must be that MRSt (c; Lot ) =
MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) :
4. If u is strongly separable in all dimensions of c; then
MRSt (c; Lot ) MRSt 1 (c; Lot )
=
(u01 (mt)  u01 (mt))
(p1u02   p2u01 (mt)) (p1u02   p2u01 (mt 1))
(p2u
0
3   p3u02) ;
with
u01 (mt)=u
0
1
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

;
u01 (mt 1)=u
0
1
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

;
u02=u
0
2
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

= u02
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

and
u03=u
0
3
 
p 11 (mt   pc) ; c;mt

= u03
 
p 11 (mt 1   pc) ; c;mt

:
It is easily seen that this is zero only at p2u03 = p3u
0
2; i.e. where
p2
p3
=
u02
u03
; which also characterizes the intrinsic optimum of a (possibly
ctitious) higher income type.
5. If u is as in condition ii) of condition 3, this ensures that
MRSt (c; Lot )   MRSt 1 (c; Lot ) is strictly decreasing if we move
along Lot towards a higher c3; guaranteeing a unique point c where
MRSt (c; Lot ) = MRS
t 1 (c; Lot ) ; as required for a unique maxi-
mum on Lot : Alternatively, it ensures that the indi¤erence curves
of type t are more concave (less convex) functions of c3 than those
of type t   1 everywhere, thus ensuring a unique tangency point
where MRSt (c; Lot ) =MRS
t 1 (c; Lot ) ; as illustrated in gure 1.
A.3 Proof of proposition 2
The optimal tuple of indirect taxes solves the problem:
max
p
L = W  vCS (p)  "NX
t2T
t
 
p1 1
p1
(mt   e(t; p1))+
p2 1
p2
e(t; p1)
!
  R
#
;
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in which  represents the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order condition
for p1 is
N
X
t2T
t
@W (:)
@vCS
@vCS (:)
@p1
  (26)
N
X
t2T
t

ct1
p1
+

p2   1
p2
  p1   1
p1

@e (t; p1)
@p1

= 0
and the rst order condition for p2 is
 N
X
t2T
t
e (t; p1)
(p2)
2 = 0: (27)
The governments revenue constraint remains
N
X
t2T
t

p1   1
p1
(mt   e(t; p1)) + p2   1
p2
e(t; p1)

= R: (28)
From equation 26, one sees that  6= 0 as long as p1 a¤ects social
welfare, i.e. as long as
P
t2T
Nt
@W (:)
@V CS
@V CS(:)
@p
1
6= 0; which is generically the
case. Because in equilibrium e (t; p1) > 0 for all but the lowest type,
equation 27 can only be satised if
p2 ! +1;
which implies that ct ! 0: Since taxing the visible good does not, in
equilibrium, a¤ect utility, this potential is maximally exploited and the
income wasted on costly signaling is recuperated as much as possible.
The overall revenues from taxing visible consumption can be written
N
p2   1
p2
X
t2T
te(t; p1) = N
X
t2T
t
 
e(t; p1)  ct

; (29)
in which the last term on the right hand side, ct; represents the part of
expenditures which the producers of visible goods still collect: Substi-
tuting equation 29 in equation 28 and solving for p1; one obtains
p1   1
p1
=
R
N
  p2 1
p2
P
t2T
te(t; p1)P
t2T
t (mt   e(t; p1))
p1=
P
t2T
t (mt   e(t; p1))P
t2T
t (mt   ct)  RN
:
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